This paper analyses the benefits of accounting regulation and a conceptual framework using an information economics approach that allows consideration of uncertainty, multiple agents, demand for information, and multiple information sources. It also allows private information to enter the analysis. The analysis leads to a set of fundamental properties of accounting information. It is argued that the set of qualitative characteristics typically contained in conceptual frameworks does not adequately aggregate the information demands of users of accounting information. For example, the IASB’s conceptual framework contains no guidelines for the trade-off between relevance and reliability. Furthermore, neutrality might not be part of an optimal regulation. The statistical bias introduced by the stewardship use of accounting information is not necessarily undesirable and will always remain; stewardship is the characteristic of accounting infbrrnation that provides incentives for management to act in the desired way. Accounting inFormation is inherently late compared to other information sources hut influences and constrains the content of more timely sources. The accounting system does not exist in a vacuum. Other information sources are present and the purpose of’ the accounting system cannot be analysed without considering the existence of other information sources. Finally, financial statements are audited by an independent auditor. This implies that accounting data are hard to manipulate.