The Role of Optional Disclosure of Financial Information in the Industrial Espionage of Companies

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Ph.D. Student of Accounting at Mazandaran University, Faculty Member of Nursing Institute of Higher Education, Khosro Saveh, Iran

Abstract

Disclosure of information includes management analysis, financial reporting accompanying notes and supplementary reports. Various theories have been used to explain the disclosure. These theories are representation theory, the theory of signification, the theory of capital need, the theory of legitimacy, and the theory of political costs. Disclosure of information can be used to reduce costs, reduce information asymmetries between companies and providers of financial resources, and reduce political costs. Industrial spy means spying for the discovery of the secrets of a rival industrial company, manufacturer, and so on. In industrial spyware, they are acquiring industrial and economic knowledge or practically supporting the actions of companies and industrial centers active in this area. Economic information; Competition factor; Reduce research and development costs. Economic spy operations lead to the production of economic information. if companies disclose less information, signaling theory is regarded as bad news and negatively affects stock prices. If volunteering provides more information according to the theory of espionage, according to industrial spy phenomena, different companies and companies The rival, use this disclosure of information for their own purposes. In this paper, first, theories that affect the disclosure of accounting information, then describe the spy industry and its effects on the economy, and finally a conceptual model is presented.

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